We explore the connection between money, banks, and aggregate credit. We start with a simple "real" model without money, where banks make loans repayable in goods and depositors hold claims on the bank payable on demand in goods. Aggregate production may be delayed in the economy. If so, we show that the level of ongoing bank lending, and hence of aggregate future output, can decrease with increases in the real repayment due on deposits: ceteris paribus, the higher the amount due, the more likely there will be insufficient goods, given the delay, to pay depositors, and the more new lending has to be curtailed to make up the shortfall. Thus a temporary delay in production can be exacerbated by banks into a more permanent reduction of total output. A number of inefficiencies including bank failures can result if deposits turn out to be too high. We then introduce money in this model. We show that if demand deposits are repayable in money rather than in goods, banks can be hedged against production delays: under certain circumstances, the price level will rise with delays in production, reducing the real value of the deposits banks have to pay out. But demand deposits payable in money can expose the banks to new risks: the value of money can fluctuate for reasons other than delays in aggregate production. Because deposits are convertible into money on demand, a temporary rise in money demand immediately boosts the interest rate banks have to pay depositors, which in turn boosts the real amounts banks have to repay them. This increase in the real deposit burden can again lead to the curtailment of bank lending and even bank failures. The way to combat these contractionary effects is to infuse more money into the banking system. Our analysis thus makes transparent how changes in the supply of money can work through banks to affect real economic activity, without invoking sticky prices, reserve requirements, or deposit insurance. It also suggests how bank failures could lead to a fall in prices and a contagion of bank failures, as described by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) .
What is the connection between money, banks, and aggregate credit? When can expansionary monetary policy lead to expanded bank credit? And when can expansionary monetary policy help avert bank failures? These are the questions that motivate this paper.
We start with a "real" model where all contracts are denominated in goods. A bank is an intermediary, which has special skills that enable it to lend to firms that are hard to collect from.
The bank finances these loans by issuing demandable claims. In Diamond and Rajan (2001) , we show why such an arrangement allows banks to fund potentially long term projects while allowing investors to consume when needed.
Unfortunately, demandable claims expose the banking system to the risk that there might be a mismatch between the production of consumption goods and the real amount promised to the depositors. Even if the mismatch is merely due to delay in production and not because of any impairment of the long-term production possibilities of the economy, a temporary aggregate shortage of consumption goods, also termed a real "liquidity shortage", can be amplified by the banking system. Banks will cut short long dated projects (that is, curtail credit). Banks may fail and failures may propagate contagiously through the system even if depositors have the most optimistic beliefs possible (unlike, say, in models like Diamond and Dybvig (1983) ).
All this is shown in an economy where all contracts, including demand deposits, pay in goods, and there is no money. The repayment on deposits is assumed fixed over the next instant and cannot be an explicit function of realizations of individual bank or aggregate conditions. Simply allowing the repayment on bank deposits to vary with the real interest rate will not completely resolve the problem. But there is another potential fix: In practice, bank deposits and loans typically repay money, not goods.
1 What would happen if we introduced money and bonds in this model, and allowed for deposit contracts denominated and repayable in money (i.e.,
nominal deposits)?
Would the systemic problems we have documented vanish? Can monetary policy play any useful role? It is to these important questions that we turn in this paper.
We focus on two essential sources of value for money. First, money is a claim on the government and may have intrinsic value from the ability of citizens to pay taxes with it. Second, it facilitates transactions: some goods may be sold only for cash as in the cash-in-advance literature (see Clower [1967] and Lucas-Stokey [1987] ). These could be goods that are illegal like drugs, goods such as services that are sold in transactions where the seller may seek to keep his identity hidden from tax authorities, or just goods encountered serendipitously where the relative cost of establishing a credit transaction may be too high. Depending on circumstances, the "fiscal" value of money may exceed or be dominated by its "transactions" value.
Suppose now that banks issue nominal deposits whose repayment is denominated in money. To the extent that the value of money in terms of goods falls when the current aggregate supply of goods is low, deposits denominated in money offer banks a natural hedge against aggregate fluctuations. And there are reasons why this might happen -the present value of taxes on production falls if production is delayed so the fiscal value of money falls. Similarly, it is plausible that transactions fall when aggregate production is delayed so the transactions value of money could also fall. The real value paid out on nominal deposits will then be state contingent in a way that reduces adverse effects on bank loan portfolios and bank health.
However, perfect state contingency is, as we show, a fairly special idealization. In fact, it is possible that the value of money be unrelated or even negatively correlated with current aggregate production: for instance, the transactions value of money may be determined by opportunities outside the formal domestic economy, or may even be negatively correlated with aggregate production. 2 When banks issue nominal demandable deposits, they are left particularly exposed to fluctuations in the purchasing power of money: Since depositors can withdraw money on demand, in a period when cash transactions are very lucrative (for example, because the supply of money is low relative to available cash goods) banks will be forced to push up the interest rates offered on demandable deposits significantly so as to keep all depositors from withdrawing. In turn, this will increase the real repayment obligations of the banks, potentially without limit. Because banks are special and their loans are illiquid, their higher repayment obligations will affect real activity. If monetary conditions thus do not fluctuate in lock-step with real activity, nominal deposit contracts can exacerbate the risks banks face.
Our analysis then suggests a channel through which monetary policy can affect credit and thus aggregate economic activity. By increasing the money supply available for transactions when the transactions demand is high (and by committing to provide monetary support in the future when needed), the monetary authority keeps the price level stable, thus limiting depositor incentives to withdraw, and consequently limiting both nominal interest rates and future real repayment obligations of banks (this point is related to Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) , though we detail a number of differences later). Banks then will respond by continuing, rather than curtailing, credit to long-term projects.
Our view of the monetary transmission mechanism could then be termed a version of the bank lending channel view (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) or Kashyap and Stein (1997) ) for comprehensive surveys) but with a difference. According to the traditional lending channel view, monetary policy affects bank loan supply, which in turn has an independent and significant effect on aggregate economic activity (this does not preclude any independent effects of movements in the discount rate or changes in the quality of corporate balance sheets). Three assumptions have been thought to be key to the centrality of banks in the transmission process: (i) binding reserve requirements tie the issuance of bank demand deposits to the availability of reserves (ii) banks and cash transactions. Similarly, if a temporary downturn prompts asset sales, a negative correlation could again emerge.
cannot substitute between demand deposits and other forms of finance easily so they have to cut down on lending when the central bank curtails reserves (iii) client firms cannot substitute between bank loans and other forms of finance, so they have to cut down on economic activity.
The concern with the traditional view of the bank lending channel is that as reserve requirements have been eliminated for almost all bank liabilities except demand deposits, the argument that banks will find it difficult or expensive to raise alternative forms of financing to demand deposits becomes less persuasive (see, for example, the critique by Romer and Romer (1990) , though see Stein (1998) who argues that demand deposits are still special because they are insured). But there does seem to be strong evidence that monetary policy has effects on bank loan supply (Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1995) , Ludvigson (1996) ), has greater effect on banks at times when their balance sheets look worse (Gibson (1996) and has the greatest effect on the policies of the smallest and least credit worthy banks (Kashyap and Stein (2000) ).
In contrast to traditional models of the lending channel, our model does not rely on reserve requirements or on deposit insurance, or even on sticky prices. An increase in the money supply increases financial liquidity, which alleviates the real liquidity demands on banks, which then allows them to fund more long-term projects to fruition. These effects will be most pronounced for constrained banks in bad times. Thus it is perhaps best to term ours the liquidity version of the lending channel of transmission.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section I, we describe the framework, in section II
we describe the problems with real deposit contracts and the circumstances under which nominal contracts can improve upon them. In section III, we introduce money and examine how aggregate activity and bank credit is affected by shortages of real and financial liquidity. In section IV we examine how monetary policy is transmitted in our model and then we conclude.
I. The Framework 1.1. Agents, Preferences, Endowments, Technology.
We will first lay out the "real" model then overlay it with a simple role for money.
Consider an economy with three types of risk neutral agents: investors, entrepreneurs, and bankers and three dates: 0, 2, and 4 (the intermediate dates are introduced later). Investors get utility only from near-term consumption, that is, their utility is the sum of consumption at, or before, date 2. All other agents get equal utility from long-term consumption also, so their utility is the sum of consumptions at all dates including date 4.
Investors are each endowed initially with a fraction of a unit of good. No other agent is endowed with goods. Goods can be stored at a gross real return of 1 or they can also be invested in projects.
Each entrepreneur has a project, which requires the investment of a unit of good before date 0. It pays off C produced goods at date 2 if the project produces early or C at date 4 if the project is delayed and produces late. There is a shortage of endowments of goods initially relative to projects that can be invested in.
Projects and the non-transferability of skills
The primary friction in the model is that those with specific skills cannot commit to using their human capital on behalf of others. This implies that they will not be able to borrow the full value of the surplus they can produce with an asset or sell the asset for the amount they can produce with it. Both projects and loans to projects will thus be illiquid because of the inalienability of human capital (see, Hart and Moore (1994) ).
Since entrepreneurs have no endowments, they need to borrow to invest. Each entrepreneur has access to a banker who has, or can acquire during the course of lending, knowledge about an alternative, but less effective, way to run the project. The banker's specific knowledge allows him to (make the credible threats that will enable him to) collect γC from an entrepreneur whose project just matures. 3 No one else has the knowledge to collect from the entrepreneur.
Regardless of whether a project is early or late, the banker can also restructure the project at any time to yield c in date-2 goods -intuitively, restructuring implies stopping half finished projects and salvaging all possible produced goods from them. Restructured projects can be collected by anyone. We assume
Since no one other than the bank has the specific skills to collect from the entrepreneur, the loan to the entrepreneur is illiquid in that the banker will get less than γC if he has to sell the loan before the project matures. Any buyer will realize that the banker will extract a future rent for collecting the loan, and the buyer will reduce the price he pays for the loan accordingly. In fact, bank loans are so dependent on the banker's specific skills for collection (that is, they are so illiquid) that the banker prefers restructuring projects to selling them.
4
Since there is a shortage of endowment relative to projects, only a select few entrepreneurs get a loan from their respective banks to buy a unit of the good from investors.
Entrepreneurs will have to promise to repay the maximum possible on demand, γC, to obtain the loan.
Financing Banks
We analyze the general equilibrium effects in an economy where banks borrow goods to lend to entrepreneurs by issuing a mix of demand deposits and bank capital. Our positive results do not depend on the reasons these forms of finance are used. In our previous work (Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) ), we argued that the demandable nature of deposit contracts introduces a collective action problem for depositors that makes them run to demand repayment whenever they anticipate the banker cannot, or will not, pay the promised amount. Thus deposits, unlike 3 See Diamond and Rajan (2001) or Hart and Moore (1994) for an extensive form game with this outcome. 4 See Diamond and Rajan (2003) for the easily satisfied conditions that lead to this outcome.
other claims, cannot be renegotiated down in an orderly fashion. Because bankers will lose all rents when their bank is run, they will not attempt to renegotiate deposits down. Deposit financing introduces a rigidity in the bank's required repayments. Ex ante, this enables the banker to commit to repay if he can (that is, avoid strategic defaults by passing through whatever he collects to depositors), but it exposes the bank to destructive runs if he truly cannot pay (it makes non-strategic default more costly): when depositors demand repayment before projects have matured and the bank does not have the means of payment, it will be forced to restructure projects to get c immediately instead of allowing them to mature and generate γC.
Such rigidity can be tempered by raising part of the funds through claims that can be renegotiated. In particular, we allow the bank to issue capital. The banker and capital holders split the residual surplus after deposits have been paid (see the extensive form game in Diamond and Rajan (2000) ). Assuming equal division, capital will be paid 2 v d − where v is the present value of the bank's assets in their best use from capital's perspective and d is the level of deposit repayments. So the virtue of capital is that its value adjusts to the underlying value of the bank's assets, its cost is that the bank cannot raise as much up front against its future receipts since the banker absorbs a fraction of the produced surplus that increases in the share of capital in the bank's initial financing.
We assume that capital has to be fraction of the present value of bank assets (this could be because of un-modeled uncertainty the bank faces on its loans or an explicit capital requirement imposed by regulators) so that the bank can raise only
against its assets by issuing a mix of deposits and capital. 5 We add bank capital to the model only to understand its effects, the key results are unchanged if we leave it out.
Uncertainty
Each bank faces an identical pool of entrepreneurs before date 0. But at date 0, the fraction of the funded projects that turn out to be early could differ. A bank's projects could all turn out to be early (type G bank) or only a fraction α B < 1 could be early (type B bank). α . In what follows, we will suppress the dependence on the state for notational convenience.
All quantities will henceforth be normalized by the total initial endowment of goods.
Timing.
Before date 0. Investors are endowed with goods. They invest them in competitive banks in return for bank claims (deposits and capital) that make them better off in expectation than storage.
Each bank offers to repay d 0 on demand per unit of good they get from investors and a commensurate value on capital. Banks lend the goods to entrepreneurs in return for a promise to repay γC on demand. Entrepreneurs invest the goods in projects.
Date 0. Uncertainty is resolved: everyone learns which entrepreneurs' projects are early and which are late, and thus what fraction α i of a bank i's projects are early. We assume that depositors in a given bank run at date 0 only if they anticipate it cannot survive at date 2 given its distribution of borrower types and given the market clearing interest rate that will prevail at date 2. In other words, we do not consider panics where depositors run at date 0 only because they 5 From the definition, we have
where the numerator on the right hand side is the value of capital and the denominator is the value of capital plus maturing deposits. Therefore, the total amount that can be pledged to investors out of the amount the bank collects is the denominator, which on substituting
think other depositors will run, regardless of date-2 fundamentals. 6 We allow collective action problems but not coordination failures.
A run will force the bank to first pay out all the goods it has, and then restructure projects (first late projects then early ones) to generate the goods needed to pay depositors. If no run occurs, the bank decides how to deal with each late project -whether to restructure it if proceeds are needed before date 4, or perhaps get greater long run value by rescheduling the loan payment from date 2 to date 4 and keep the project as a going concern.
Date 2. Entrepreneurs with early projects will produce C, and repay the bank γC. This leaves them with (1-γ)C to invest as they will. The bank obtains repayments from early entrepreneurs, proceeds from restructured late projects, and raises new funds by issuing a mix of deposits and capital to early entrepreneurs and other bankers with surplus. It must meet capital requirements for these new issues. Initial investors present their claims and are paid out of the funds (goods) the bank raises, which they consume. We showed in Diamond and Rajan (2001) that banks and their fragile liability structures are essential to facilitate the flow of credit from investors with uncertain consumption needs to entrepreneurs who have hard-to-pledge cash flows. If investors lent directly, acquired collection skills, but wanted to consume at an interim date, they would have to sell their loans at a huge discount. Far better to hold demand deposits on a bank and let the bank acquire the collection skills. If the investor wants to consume at an interim date, the bank will pay him and refinance by borrowing from others (early entrepreneurs) who have a surplus. In this way, the bank does not interrupt the late, but valuable, project while also allowing the investor to consume a larger amount when he desires consumption.
Unfortunately, the liability structure of banks leaves them exposed to temporary aggregate shortages of goods. A small delay in the supply of goods relative to their demand can propagate through bank credit contraction and bank failures into a longer term, and more widespread adverse shock to production. This is what we show now. Once we see how the "real" model works, we will be able to see clearly the role of money in this model.
Banks' maximization problem after uncertainty is revealed
Because the G type banker's projects all mature at date 2, he will have enough to repay investors provided 0 (and under no circumstances will the initial level of deposits be set higher than γ , else banks would not be able to repay under any circumstances and would all be run 
The first term is the amount repaid by the α early entrepreneurs whose projects mature at date 2.
The second term is the amount obtained by restructuring late projects. The third term is the amount the bank can raise (in new deposits and capital -see (1.2)) against late projects that are allowed to continue without interruption till date 4, where r 24 is the real interest rate banks offer on deposits between dates 2 and 4 (this need not be 1 because the initial investors prefer date 2 consumption over date 4 consumption).
In bargaining over how much they have to be paid, capital holders will demand payment based on the level of restructuring that maximizes what they get rather than the actual level chosen by the banker. 8 Hence the repayment to capital and deposits is
Therefore the constraint on the banker, (2.2), is simply that the resources he can raise should exceed the required repayment. 8 Intuitively, the splitting of residual surplus between capital and the banker follows from a bargaining game where each one has the right to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the other with equal probability (as in Hart and Moore (1994) or Diamond and Rajan (2000) ). When capital makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer to the banker, it will demand all the value the banker generates net of deposits when the assets are put to their best use from the perspective of capital. Hence the repayment is a function of the µ that maximizes capital's claim. 9 Capital gets (v-d)/2 while depositors get d. The banker's objective is to maximize the present value of his total consumption. Since the repayment required from the banker to initial investors is independent of the actual level of restructuring chosen, the banker is the residual claimant to repayments by entrepreneurs on project loans and his objective can be changed to maximizing the present value of the total repayments on received by the bank on project loans, as in (2.1). Note that this exceeds (2.3), the amount he can raise at date 2, because the banker cannot raise money against his own prospective future rents. The solution to the banker's problem is , the banker will restructure all late projects and the bank will survive provided v r .
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(1, )
The lemma indicates the fraction the banker restructures increases with the real interest rate. At low interest rates (r 24 <R), the banker gets more value and can raise more by continuing late projects. At high interest ( 24 r ≥ R ) the banker gets more value and can raise more by restructuring late projects. But at intermediate rates, the banker has an incentive to continue, though he can pay claimants more by restructuring. This is because the banker gets rents from continued late projects that bank claimants do not see (the last term in (2.1) is greater than the last term in (2.3)). So he will restructure the minimum that will be necessary to pay off claimants.
Other decisions are less complicated. The entrepreneur's production decision is entirely passive -he produces in due course if his project is not restructured by the bank beforehand. If he produces, he repays the bank. Early entrepreneurs invest their residual goods (of (1 ) in the bank at date 2 if it can credibly promise to repay r 24 ≥ 1.
Equilibrium Condition and aggregate credit.
The only price at date 2 in this "real" model is the relative price of date 2 to date 4 consumption: the real interest rate, r 24 . Since investors can express their purchasing power only with their claims on the bank, the demand for consumption at date 2 (real liquidity) is the total real value of their claims on the bank. The real interest rate ensures the total investor demand for goods at date 2 is weakly less than the supply of goods. Thus market clearing implies
The real side of our model should now be fairly clear. The adverse shocks in our model are merely delays in the timing of production -adverse shocks to the quantities produced would only exacerbate the problems. Even though the total production possibilities of the economy over If severe enough, aggregate delays can also cause banks to fail. Recall that if a bank is expected to fail, depositors run and demand payment immediately on the revelation of uncertainty at date 0. Since projects pay at date 2 at the earliest, and since the bank obtains more from restructuring rather than selling the illiquid project loans to satisfy depositor demands at date 0, all projects including the early ones have to be restructured. Failure is inefficient because early projects could have produced C in a timely manner to satisfy the consumption needs of date-0 investors, but now produce only c. The collective action problem inherent in demand deposits is now destructive for it forces the costly production of consumption goods when none is really needed! When all contracts are real, there is only one price -the real interest rate -which can adjust to clear markets. The system may have insufficient degrees of freedom to adjust to an adverse shock, resulting in the stark consequences we have documented (as we will argue in the example later, even deposit contracts contingent on the real interest rate will not be sufficient to eliminate these problems, what we really need is deposit contracts with full state contingency).
This real model is not without practical interest -when a country's banking system has deposits denominated in foreign exchange (or if the country were on the Gold standard), it is as if the banks have issued real deposits. But our primary purpose in investigating the real model is to pinpoint the links between the "real" economy and money. As we will see, one link emerges when banks issue nominal deposits, that is, deposits denominated in cash. Money affects the price level, which in turn will affect the real payout on nominal deposits. As we have just seen the required real payout on deposits can affect the level of real activity. This is the link we now make clear.
III. Money and Banking
We focus on two natural sources of value for money. First, money can serve as a store of value; we introduce this into our finite horizon economy by assuming that money (and any maturing government liability) can be used to pay future taxes. This is one anchor for the value of money, which we shall call the fiscal demand. Second, money facilitates certain transactions that by their very nature are unexpected, opportunistic, small-volume, or worth concealing so that the use of formal credit is ruled out. This is the transactions demand for money. Both demands will be important in understanding the link between money and banking.
Transactions Demand
Start first with the transactions demand. We introduce one more agent, the dealer, who obtains equal utility from consuming a unit at any date. The dealer receives an endowment of a perishable good, which can be sold only for cash (to fix ideas, the good is his labor, and he does not report this income to the tax authorities so he accepts only cash). "Early" dealers obtain an endowment q of this cash good at date 1 while "late" dealers obtain q at date 3. One unit of this cash good produces the same consumption utility as one unit of the production good. Unlike the cash good, both deposits and cash can be used to pay for the production good. In what follows, we will use the terms "cash" and "money" interchangeably. To introduce a motive for trade for all goods, we assume that no one can consume his or her own endowment or production, therefore everyone must trade to consume. All trades require payment one period ahead in cash or deposits. This means that in order to consume a cash good that is produced at date T, the buyer has to pay cash to the seller at date T-1. If he wants to consume a production good, he also has the option of writing a check to the seller at date T-1, which will clear against the funds he has on deposit at date T. The seller can use the cash or deposit he receives at date T to buy goods for consumption at date T+1. This payment in advance constraint also applies to sales of bonds (to be described) and restructured loans. Finally, if a bank issues claims (in exchange for cash, bonds or loans) at date T, they can be used to initiate transactions at date T.
The Fiscal Demand.
The government endows investors before date 0 with M 0 of money and nominal bonds maturing at date 2 with face value B 2 . 10 When the bonds mature, the government extinguishes them by repaying their face value in new money or issuing fresh bonds maturing at date 4.
The government taxes sales of produced goods at the rate t (assume now that C is the after-tax quantity produced from a project, so total nominal taxes due on a project that matures at date T are 1 tC t − TT P where is the cash price of a unit of consumption at date T). Because cash goods may lie outside the formal economy, we assume they are not taxed (nothing depends on this). Taxes are due at the time of production and are payable in money.
TT P
The odd-numbered dates, 1 and 3, are introduced just for the purposes of making the payment and settlement explicit. They could be thought of as close to dates 2 and 4 respectively. Two simplifying assumptions are reasonable. First, all actions that are to take place at date 4 can be committed to at date 3, and similarly, actions at date 2 can be committed to at date 1. In particular, this assumption allows late entrepreneurs to borrow deposits at date 3 against what they will have at date 4 after repaying the bank loan (= (1 )C γ − ). They can use the resulting deposits at date 3 to purchase goods for consumption at date 4. Similarly, the banker can also monetize his date-4 rents. Second, bank capital can be used as a means of payment whenever deposits can (or investors can borrow deposits pledging the value of the bank capital they hold at dates 1 and 3). If it were not for these assumptions, we would need to introduce another date to clear purchases initiated at date 4.
Money and Prices
We now have all the apparatus we need to determine prices. Once we determine prices in this economy, the channel from real activity to prices to the value of nominal deposits and back to real activity will become clear. We will see that there is a possibility of the banking system "automatically" stabilizing aggregate liquidity shocks through changes (via prices) in the real value of nominal deposits. The system may also be destabilizing. Interestingly, both the possibility of destabilization and the policy remedies to correct it depend on the type of money demand that dominates at that juncture. Since both bank claims and cash can be used to pay for produced goods, effectively all assets held by the bank including bonds are available as means of payment for produced goods whenever banks are solvent. By contrast, only cash can pay for cash goods and for taxes. There is a competitive market for deposits, bonds and goods at each relevant date from date 0, subject to the payment in advance constraints. Since cash goods and produced goods offer equivalent consumption on the dates agents want to consume, their relative prices will impose no-arbitrage constraints on the banking system. This will be important in what follows.
Assume that the quantities of money and bonds do not change after date 2, there are M 2 units of money, and there are bonds that will mature into B 4 units of cash at date 4. At date 4, cash is useful only to pay taxes, so it will be accepted in payment for produced goods because the seller wants to use them to pay taxes. Define X 4 as the quantity of goods sold for date 4 delivery.
The nominal sales (all sales, including those paid with bank claims) is , nominal tax owed is tP
, and the total supply of cash at date 4 is
11 As a result, 11 Implicit in this is that the price of produced goods in assignable date-4 deposits (what one could term P 44 ) is the same as its price in date-3 cash. Equivalently, the gross nominal interest rate on bonds and deposits between dates 3 and 4, i 34 , equals 1. Suppose not and the rate banks paid on deposits were higher than 1. Then everyone would deposit their cash in banks and use deposits to buy goods. But for any bank to hold cash, the rate on deposits should be 1, else the bank would use any excess cash to pay down deposits. Similarly, for banks to hold cash and bonds, the rates of return on them should be equal. So the nominal rate, i 34 , is 1 and cash, deposits, and bonds pay the same rate, as they will on all dates that cash has no special value. This also explains why i 12 equals 1. (2.5) This is a very simple version of the fiscal theory of the price level (see Calomiris [1988] , Cochrane (2001) and Woodford (1995)) At date 2, the purchase of of cash goods can be initiated with the outstanding date-2 cash, 3 q 2 M . Since agents who get utility from consumption after date 2 are indifferent between consumption at date 3 or date 4, a holder of date-2 cash will spend it at date 2 or 3 depending on where he can purchase greater consumption. So the real value of the money stock at date 2 will be the larger of its purchasing power in buying cash goods for delivery at date 3 or the value of holding it to purchase produced goods at date 3 for delivery at date 4. 12 The purchasing power of the money stock is: 2 (it has a liquidity premium) than as a store of value -the transactions demand dominates. Since a depositor can withdraw cash on date 2 to make payments, for someone to leave their money in 12 Another way to see this is that so long as the price of cash goods for transactions initiated at date 2 is below the price of produced goods at date 3, money will be fully used up in buying cash goods. But once there is enough money such that the price of cash goods equals the price of produced goods, any money left over after buying cash goods will be used as a store of value till it can be used for purchasing produced goods at date 3. Therefore, money will effectively be valued in terms of its date-3 purchasing power. This is the intuition behind the max function.
the bank (or hold a non-monetary asset), deposits must offer a gross nominal interest rate of To determine the price level at earlier dates to date 2, we have to determine the real value of all government liabilities at date 2. Since we already know the value of the money stock, we now determine the value of outstanding bonds.
Let the date-2 value in cash of bonds maturing to pay B 4 at date 4 be b 24 . Then because of the competitive market for bonds, the date 2 cash value of these bonds taxes as well as "buy" M 2 and B 4 . Because the initial investors only value consumption on or before date 2, the real interest rate (that sets the relative price of consumption on or before date 2 and consumption after), r 24 , can be greater than one even when date 2 consumption is positive. >1.
In all of these expressions, the price level and the nominal interest rate depend on both the state of nature (through transaction demands,q 1 and q 3 , fiscal demands X 1 and X 2 , and the effect of liquidity conditions r 24 ), and monetary policy variables (M 0 , M 2 , B 2 , B 4 ). For fixed fiscal and monetary policies, the state continent price level implies a given state dependent real value of nominal bank liabilities. There are some simple conditions when such automatic contingency stabilizes the banking system against liquidity shocks. To see how this might work, we have to revisit our "real" banking system to introduce money and goods prices.
Revisiting the "real" model.
First, assume the bank continues to issue real deposits -where the holder of a deposit with face value d 0 is paid a sum of d 0 *P T2 in cash if the deposit is withdrawn at any time T on or before date 2 (where P 22 = P 12 , by the argument in footnote 11). The main difference now is that banks will also hold money and bonds initially and depositors will withdraw some cash to buy cash goods at date 0. Also, cash goods will add to the supply of goods that are available to satisfy the initial investors' demand for consumption. However, it is easy to transform this seemingly more complicated problem into the simple form we have already seen.
Let us assume without loss of generality that the ex ante identical banks hold all the money and bonds initially (and offer initial investors claims in return for keeping these in the bank (1 ) (1 )(1 )
The numerator in the first term is the cash value of financial assets the bank holds, and it has to be divided by the date-1 price to get the value of those assets in terms of date-2 consumption. The term in square brackets is the value of the bank's project loans. Adding back the consumption value obtained by date-0 withdrawers, q 1 , and simplifying, we get the value available to pay bank claimants to be , ,
Suppressing prices in , we get analogous expressions to (2.1), (2.2), and (2.4). (1 ) The equilibrium market clearing condition for date-2 consumption (real liquidity) is ( ) In sum then, if banks survive, the equilibrium prices, credit, and interest rates are obtained from solving (2.10) s.t. (2.6), (2.7), (2.11), and (2.12). In an appendix available from the authors, we present the full maximization problem as well as the clearing conditions with the cash in advance constraints. It is easily checked that the prices derived in the previous sub-section, the nominal interest rates, and the real interest rate r 24 do indeed clear the market. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 continue to hold, as we show in the appendix.
In summary then, augmenting the basic model with prices, financial assets, and cash goods does not change the basic insight that in the face of aggregate liquidity shortages, banks curtail credit and may even fail, severely dampening production. The point this makes clear is that credit contraction and failure are essentially real phenomena and occur when the bank is squeezed between non-renegotiable demand deposits fixed in real terms and a limited production of consumption goods. This then suggests that a potential way to avoid liquidity squeezes is to allow demand deposits to be denominated in cash, so that their real value could fluctuate with the price level. If the price level rises when there are production delays, nominal deposits could offer a hedge against aggregate shortages. Under special circumstances, this is indeed the case.
Nominal Deposits as a Hedge against Aggregate Liquidity Shortages.
Let banks issue nominal deposits of face value 0 δ outstanding at date 0 instead of real deposits.
These give the depositor the right to withdraw 0 δ units of cash on demand. Deposits will return the nominal rate, i 01 , if rolled over till date 1.
Fiscal demand dominates.
First consider a situation where the fiscal demand dominates -for example, when there is plenty of money relative to cash goods, so at the margin money is valued only for its role in paying taxes. It is easy to see from (2.6) that 0 2 02 12 4 2 24
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So prices are inversely proportional to the present value of taxes, which is a constant function of discounted real production. Now nominal deposits serve as a hedge: the real payment they entail adjusts via the price level to the available amount that a "representative bank" can pay. If the real amount that a bank can collect on loans is fixed (or is relatively invariant with prices), and if bank asset portfolios are reasonably similar, price level changes will eliminate liquidity shortages, and the resulting credit squeezes and bank failures.
To see this, consider a "representative" bank (with Intuitively, when loans are real and deposits are nominal, when the value of money is determined primarily by the present value of real activity (as in the fiscal theory), and when there are no significant differences between bank portfolios (so that each one of them is a microcosm of the overall productive economy), banks are well hedged against aggregate liquidity shortages. An incipient shortage increases the price level and reduces the real value required to be paid out on the nominal deposits, thus alleviating the shortage. Nominal deposits are automatic stabilizers.
The requirements for this result are fairly stringent: First, we require each bank's loan portfolio to be representative of aggregate economic activity, that is, bank portfolios are identical.
If not, while the aggregate banking sector is hedged, individual banks are not. If there is variation in α i across bank portfolios, then banks with low α i can fail, even when they have issued nominal deposits. Of course, given our results that prices adjust to aggregate liquidity, there exists a set of cross-subsidies from high α banks to low α banks that will keep all the banks alive. These crosssubsidies may not be privately rational for a healthy bank but may be in the collective interest.
Second, repayments on loans to projects should vary in proportion to aggregate real output. This would be true if loan contracts specify repayments in real terms or if borrowers typically promised to pay a high nominal amount, which is invariably renegotiated down to a real amount based on the real threat of foreclosure (and the real value of underlying collateral assets).
It would not be true if loans entailed modest nominal repayments.
Third, for the fiscal demand to provide a value of nominal claims that is proportional to the discounted value of real production, taxation should also be proportional to aggregate production (for example, a linear sales tax).
A Well-Behaved Dominant Transactions Demand
All this was derived in the context of a dominant fiscal demand for money. We can obtain a similar result to Proposition 2 if the transactions demand were "well" behaved. For both the example of dominant fiscal demand or this well behaved dominant transactions demand, prices vary inversely with available real liquidity, banks that issue nominal deposits have built in state contingency into their deposit liabilities even though the state of liquidity cannot be directly contracted on. We have already noted a number of stringent conditions for this to be true.
Nominal Deposits and Destabilizing Transactions Demand.
Now consider a situation where nominal deposits do not serve as a hedge. Let the quantity of cash goods at date 1, , be a constant instead of being a fraction of date-2 production. Let the transactions demand dominate, implying the value of money is set by its value 1 q in purchasing cash goods. Since the quantity of cash goods does not vary with the state, nominal deposits have a fixed real value for a given money stock.
At date 0, depositors can withdraw up to 0 δ in cash to buy the cash good, but they can also roll over their deposit at the prevailing nominal rate, i 01 . Since banks set the nominal rate 12 01 02 P i P = to make depositors indifferent between withdrawing cash to buy cash goods at date 0 and paying with deposits for delivery at date 2, it must be that the real value a bank has to pay out at date 2 is Intuitively, if depositors are promised a fixed amount of cash rather than a fixed real value, their real claim at date 2 depends on the outside opportunity depositors have to spend cash between dates 0 and date 2. In our model, the only outside opportunity they have is to buy cash goods, so if the price of cash goods is low, the real burden of deposit claims on banks becomes very high. Moreover, the real burden of repayment is now a function of the ex ante contracted level of nominal deposits, the quantity of cash goods available for purchase at date 0, and the quantity of money held by the banks, M 0 , none of which are necessarily sensitive to the realized fraction of early projects, α .
The banking system may now be worse off issuing nominal demand deposits. Worse still, if the quantity of cash goods, q 1 , is not constant but has a negative correlation with α (for example if the illegal economy expands when the legal economy is anticipated to be down), the real deposit burden on banks issuing nominal deposits will be high precisely when they have the least resources to pay. By contrast, the repayment burden if real deposits had been issued would be constant across states, and this will result in lower bank failures. An example may be useful in bringing all this together.
Example:
Let the fraction of banks of type G be θ real interest rate is now higher at 1.58. The reason for the higher real rate is that the B type banks now have higher date-2 value, so they can bid a higher rate for deposits and thereby reduce the fraction they have to restructure. Therefore the greater available real liquidity gets partly "absorbed" in greater credit (which goes up from 0.43 to 0.51) and partly in greater consumption by the now-richer date-0 investors (also see Figure 3 ).
Of course, if aggregate liquidity is too low, the B type banks might have to fail before aggregate demand for liquidity comes into balance with aggregate supply. As 
Discussion.
The point we have made is worth elaborating. When a bank offers nominal deposit contracts, its real repayment burden depends on monetary conditions and the state contingent movement in the price level. Too little money in the system can make cash transactions extremely lucrative. Real interest rates on deposits have to rise because depositors have the right to withdraw cash. Not only does this make the bank highly susceptible to fleeting opportunities available in the cash market even if that market is quite small, it also forces a future real liability on the bank (and a potential aggregate real liquidity shortage), even if the bank has issued nominal deposits. The nature of the bank's liabilities is critical to why it is susceptible to monetary fluctuations.
Important prior work has noted unaccommodated shocks to money demand can cause bank panics when banks issue nominal liabilities (see Champ, Smith and Williamson [1996] ).
There are a number of differences in our paper. First, unlike in our paper, the underlying real conditions in Champ et al. [1996] are fixed and not endogenous to bank decisions.
Second, in their model a fraction of investors have a direct demand for cash (because they are moving elsewhere). By contrast, in our model investors have a derived demand for cash based on opportunities in the cash goods market. These differences matter. First, we can examine the effects of real and financial liquidity (money) on not just bank failures but also bank credit.
Second, the correlation between opportunities in the cash market and (endogenous) aggregate real liquidity determines whether the banking system is stable or not. Third, even if only a small fraction of investors have a direct demand for cash, the combination of a real liquidity shortage and lucrative cash transactions can be lethal for banks though not necessarily for other financial firms (we elaborate on this shortly).
That real deposits can be more stable than nominal deposits may account for why some banking systems issue them. Recently, the banking system in Argentina had committed to repay depositors in dollars (effectively real deposits in a peso economy) but the country did not have the dollars, or could not attract enough of them, to repay depositors. Faced with such a shortage, banks failed in 2002. The lesson some economists draw from this crisis is that the banking system should not have issued real (i.e., dollar denominated) deposits.
But issuing peso denominated deposits may not be a panacea unless the value of the peso in terms of both local goods and foreign exchange fully and always reflects the condition of the real economy and the banking system's ability to pay. But if the value of the peso fluctuates in ways that do not reflect the underlying state of the economy, then the real repayment burden on the banks issuing nominal deposits will become much higher than would be the case if it were fixed in real terms. For instance, if investors fear that the government will devalue the peso in the future or expect a speculative attack on it, then the nominal and real interest rate on peso denominated deposits will have to rise to match the real opportunities available to depositors who can withdraw pesos to buy dollars and then foreign goods. The real repayment burden on the banks will then become a function of the maximum overvaluation of the peso, and the health of banks will become hostage to the country's competence and credibility in managing its exchange rate. If this is questionable to begin with, the country's banking system might be better off issuing "real" deposits.
IV. The Channels of Transmission of Monetary Policy

Effects of Policy Changes
We have assumed that both monetary and fiscal policy remain fixed even in the face of shocks to aggregate production or to the supply of cash goods. We can examine the effects of policy changes that work through the banking system when there are nominal deposits.
First, when the fiscal demand dominates, the nominal interest rate is zero. So open market operations exchanging money for bonds will have no effect on the price level or aggregate credit. Only changes in the real tax rate or a "helicopter" drop of money will change the price level. By contrast, when the transactions demand dominates, money has a liquidity premium; the nominal interest rate is no longer zero, and exchanging money for bonds and vice versa will have real effects. Let us examine this in more detail.
The Channels of Transmission of Monetary Policy: The Liquidity Channel
In our model, a current shortage of money relative to cash goods causes an incipient drain on the banking system, which is averted only if the banks pay depositors a very high nominal rate. But this increases future bank obligations (aggregate real liquidity demand), which will be met by increases in the real interest rate, by curtailing credit and restructuring projects, and by bank failures.
This then suggests a "liquidity" channel through which monetary policy can affect real economic activity: ultimately it works through prices, interest rates, and bank balance sheets, all ingredients that have been separately identified by other theories of transmission (see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) or Stein (1994, 1997) an open market repurchase of bonds with money at date 0 will have no effect on the amount of credit available at date 2.
When the nominal interest rate is 1, money and bonds are equivalent because the marginal unit of money provides no transaction services while bonds provide no interest -there is enough money at date 0 that the price of cash goods purchased at that date equals the price of produced goods at date 1. Any additional money issued by the monetary authority to repurchase bonds will be held by the banks as a store of value and not withdrawn by investors for date-0 transactions. Open market operations will have no effect on the date-0 price of cash goods, P 02, and none on banks' real deposit burden at date 2.
Finally, a few notes. First, because a significant portion of bank liabilities is convertible on demand, banks are susceptible to temporary spikes in the transactions demand for money. By Second, we have modeled the temporary shock as one to money demand, coming from a surge in supply of cash goods. It could equally well come from a direct increase in the demand for cash (for instance, a flight to cash) or from temporary fluctuations in the supply of money.
Finally, note there are other channels through which an exchange of money for bonds can affect the real activity of banks. In particular, it could work by altering the real value of financial assets on bank balance sheets. We describe such a channel, which we call the financial asset channel, in the appendix. In practice, it may be a less important channel for banks.
Does our model square with modern facts?
The pattern of response of aggregate output to monetary expansion has been well studied in the United States (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) ). One fact that is at odds with our model is that prices do not adjust rapidly. While we think the fact that our model does not require sticky prices to obtain monetary transmission is a virtue, we need to ask how we could get transmission if prices were indeed sticky. It turns out that a simple extension is sufficient.
Consider a very simple search model where dealers first post prices at the beginning of the period and buyers search for a seller. There must be some rationing if the price cannot vary with supply or demand changes. Assume that the probability of a buyer meeting a dealer is an increasing function of the ratio of supply of cash goods to demand at the posted price, P 02 . The nominal supply of goods at date 0 is q 1 P 02 and the nominal demand is the total amount of cash withdrawn at date 0 by depositors. An open market operation that increases the amount of cash that can be withdrawn by depositors will decrease the probability of each withdrawer finding a dealer. As this probability decreases, the return from withdrawing cash falls toward the return of holding cash to buy goods one period later, and the nominal interest rate on bank deposits between dates 0 and 1 will fall (as will the real rate because of sticky prices). Thus the real payout burden on deposits at date 2 falls with an expansionary open market operation, much as in the case of flexible prices.
Financial Contagion.
Our model offers a stark and transparent way of modeling the use of money in payments.
This allows us to see the effects of alternative assumptions. For instance, suppose depositors who run on a bank will not accept deposits on other banks but will only take money (for instance, because they may need time to verify the quality of the bank they will deposit in). With this small change in assumptions, bank failures can become contagious through their effect on monetary conditions.
In particular, suppose now that type B banks are not expected to meet their nominal deposit obligations at date 2 and fail. Then they will be run immediately at date 0. They will pay out their cash reserves to depositors, but once the B type banks run out, they will have to sell assets. If the only asset that their depositors will accept is cash, the bank's assets must be sold for cash (and not for deposits in other banks). The sale of the bank's assets will lock up more cash in transactions, leaving less cash to buy cash goods. The cash good price will fall further to where the denominator in (2.15) now also includes the value of restructured loans and bonds that the B type banks sell. At this "fire-sale" price, the purchase of cash goods becomes even more lucrative, and forces the G type banks to pay a yet higher rate to keep their depositors from moving to cash. 17 Given the higher effective payout to deposits at date 2, these type G banks could also fail if
The mechanism here resembles the contagious bank failures described by Friedman and Schwarz (1963) : Depositors run on banks and take money, forcing banks to sell assets for cash, which renders the money supply inadequate for the quantum of real activity, forcing a further drop in the price level and still more bank failures.
Conclusion
We have introduced money in a real model of banking. We show that there is a connection between bank lending and monetary conditions, especially in situations where there is a binding aggregate supply of real liquidity. We show that monetary intervention can have real effects even in a world without many of the traditional assumed frictions. We also show that while nominal deposits can, under fairly restrictive conditions, serve as a natural hedge, in general they do not insulate the bank against adverse shocks. In fact, a bank that has issued real deposits may be better hedged.
Turning to the scope for future work, we have made a number of strong assumptions to simplify our analysis. Initial investors cannot substitute at all for consumption between dates. The qualitative results will not change if they have a strong preference for date 2 consumption over date 4 consumption, except that they may be willing to postpone consumption once the interest rate rises enough. This will cap how destructive liquidity shortages can be.
The required repayment on deposits is never determined by the underlying value of bank assets (because bank deposits can never be renegotiated down). Therefore, bank deposits can be denominated effectively in nominal terms. By contrast, we assume that repayments on bank loans are determined by the underlying value of collateral, so they are effectively real even if denominated in nominal quantities. Of course, if the required nominal repayment on a bank loan is small relative to the underlying collateral, then the bank loan is effectively denominated in nominal terms. This is likely to be the case in cyclical upturns. So a fruitful extension would be to see how the value of a bank's loan portfolio responds to changes in monetary policy, and how this affects credit. One conjecture is that this will depend on the phase of the business cycle.
There are a variety of other simplifying assumptions: we have no limitation on transactions imposed by the availability of deposits in this model. We do not have long dated bonds. Fiscal policy is relatively static in our model. Finally, we do not have agents who are totally outside the banking system. Relaxing each of these is a realistic and potentially interesting extension that suggests scope for future work.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
In equilibrium, three conditions have to be met at date 2: The B type bank should be just solvent, aggregate liquidity demand should equal aggregate liquidity supply (goods market clearing) and the money market should clear.
Let us write down the three conditions, expand them and collect terms.
For aggregate liquidity supply to be equal to aggregate liquidity demand, we must have (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 ) 
Finally, for money market equilibrium, we have ( ) 
Proof of Proposition 1 (i):
Implicitly differentiating (2.20) w.r.t. 
Some tedious but straightforward algebra shows that the numerator is negative, where we use the condition that some restructuring is needed at any price to prove that k 1 <0.
To sign the denominator, note that it is in the form 2 Expanding the terms under E and substituting from the above inequality, we get E is greater than Proof of Proposition 1 (iii) (sketch):
As banks restructure more to cope with a low B α (part (ii)), eventually 1 B µ = and now no more liquidity will be available through restructuring. Banks will have to fail if B α falls further else the aggregate liquidity constraint will not be met.
Proof of Proposition 1 (iv).
Because the real interest rate between dates 0 and 2 is always equal to 1, an the face value of deposits necessary on date 2 d 2 that must prevail in order to retain deposits that can withdraw d 0 on date 0 is a strictly increasing function of d 0 .
Implicitly differentiating (2.20) w.r.t. , we get buy cash goods at a deeply discounted price, but also government bonds maturing at date 4 account for the lion's share of the public's claims on the government, so bonds capture the full value of real taxes. As the money stock increases, the dealers in the cash market at date 3 no longer have to sell goods for a deeply discounted price. Also bonds have to share the value of real taxes with holders of money. Therefore, as the amount of money outstanding increases relative to bonds, and as the nominal rate falls to 1, the real value of government liabilities (money plus bonds) holding real activity and real rates constant falls. 18 Of course, once the nominal rate falls to one, no further alteration in value is possible, and further open market operations lose all effect.
19
Thus expansionary open market operations reduce the real value of government assets held by banks at date 2, and reduce aggregate liquidity demand by reducing the real value of the bank's liabilities. This leads to an expansion in bank credit for similar reasons to the ones discussed in the previous sub-section. The "financial asset" channel is probably weaker than the "liquidity" channel because the former works primarily by altering the value of bank liabilities such as capital that are most sensitive to bank asset values (unlike the latter which works by altering the real value of deposit payouts). In practice, non-deposit bank liabilities are less likely to be held for liquidity or transactions purposes, and thus the change in their value will have less of an effect on the aggregate demand for liquidity. 18 Contrast this with the effect on nominal liabilities. Pushing down the nominal interest rate increases the nominal value of bonds and the total nominal value of government claims. 19 Note also that the government's real revenues are unchanged if real output does not change (and government expenditure is fixed). So substituting interest-bearing liabilities for non-interest bearing ones does not result in a greater real claim on the government or in lower seigniorage profits. There are no sticky prices in our model. Open market operations simply transfer value from one set of agents to others but do not alter the aggregate real future payments by the government. 
